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PRESENTED BY 





THE RECOGNITION of PANAMA 

Hfcfcress 

DELIVERED AT MASSACHUSETTS REFORM CLUB 

December. 5, 1903 



BY 

MOORFIELD STOREY 



r 



?2/f?f 



BOSTON 
Geo. H. Ellis Co., Printers, 272 Congress Street 

1904 



Gift 

MrsW.A. Croffut 
24 >Q6 



THE RECOGNITION OF PANAMA. 



In order to discuss intelligently the action of the ad- 
ministration toward the Republic of Colombia, it is necessary 
first to know the facts, and I will endeavor to state these 
briefly. 

The treaty of 1 846 between the United States and New 
Granada, in the words of Secretary Hay, " is not dependent 
for its efficacy on the personnel of the signers or the name of 
the territory it affects," but "is a covenant, as the lawyers 
say, that runs with the land." That is, it binds both the 
United States and the Republic of Colombia, which has 
succeeded to the rights and obligations of New Granada. 

This treaty contained the following reciprocal agreements : 

"The government of New Granada guarantees to the 
government of the United States that the right of way or 
transit across the Isthmus of Panama upon any modes of 
communication that now exist, or that may hereafter be 
constructed, shall be open and free to the government and 
citizens of the United States," and "as an especial com- 
pensation for the said advantages and for the favors they have 
acquired by the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles of this treaty 
the United States guarantee positively and efficaciously to 
New Granada by the present stipulation the perfect neutrality 
of the before-mentioned isthmus with the view that the 
transit from one sea to the other may not be interrupted or 
embarrassed in any future time while this treaty exists, and 
in consequence the United States also guarantee in the same 
manner tlie rights of sovereignty and property which New 
Granada has and possesses over the said territory." 

Construing the language fairly, New Granada warrants to 
the United States that travel across the isthmus shall not be 
interrupted and the United States warrants to New Granada 



nized the sovereignty and obligation of Colombia in the prem- 
ises, and has never acknowledged, but, on the contrary, has 
expressly disclaimed-, the duty of protecting the transit against 
domestic disturbance" 

President Cleveland in his annual message of December, 
1885, spoke thus : — 

" Emergencies growing out of civil war in the United 
States of Colombia demanded of the government at the be- 
ginning of this Administration the employment of armed force 
to fulfil its guarantees under the thirty-fifth article of the treaty 
of 1846, in order to keep the transit open across the Isthmus 
of Panama. Desirous of exercising only the powers expressly 
reserved to us by the treaty, and mindful of the rights of 
Colombia, the forces sent to the isthmus were instructed to 
confine their action to ' positively and efficaciously ' preventing 
the transit and its accessories from being 'interrupted or em- 
barrassed.' The execution of this delicate and responsible 
task necessarily involved police control where the local au- 
thority was temporarily powerless, but always in aid of the 
sovereignty in Colombia. The prompt and successful fulfil- 
ment of its duty by this government was highly appreciated 
by the government of Colombia, and has been followed by 
expressions of its satisfaction. . . . The restoration of peace on 
the isthmus by the re-establishment of the constituted govern- 
ment there being accomplished, the forces of the United 
States were withdrawn." 

While, therefore, we had once or twice landed troops when 
there were riots or insurrections on the isthmus, we had done 
so in aid of the sovereignty of Colombia, sometimes at the 
request of her authorities, and always with her approval. 
We had insisted that upon her rested the duty of protecting 
the transit against attacks from insurgents, and had notified 
her that "the discharge of this duty will be insisted upon." 
Our interpretation of the treaty and our action under it had 
been in accordance with the clear language of the treaty. 
We had helped Colombia to discharge her duty and to assert 
her sovereignty. We had never interfered nor claimed the 
right to interfere against her. 



There is another diplomatic precedent which should not 
be forgotten in this connection. I refer to the famous 
Ostend Manifesto. In 1854 Messrs. Buchanan, Mason, and 
Soule, the ministers of the United States at London, Paris, 
and Madrid, met at Ostend and issued a joint declaration 
advising the purchase of Cuba by the United States for 
$ 1 20,000,000, and proceeding : — 

"If Spain, dead to the voice of her own interest and 
actuated by stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should 
refuse to sell Cuba to the United States, then the question 
will arise, What ought to be the course of the United States 
under the circumstances ? " 

They answered their own question by saying, — 

" After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba far 
beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, . . . 
then by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in 
wresting it from Spain, if we have the power." 

This immoral declaration was justly condemned at the 
time and by none more distinctly than by the Republican 
party, which in its national platform in 1856 asserted the true 
doctrine in these words : — 

" The highwayman's plea that ' might makes right ' embodied 
in the Ostend circular was in every respect unworthy of 
American diplomacy, and would bring shame and dishonor 
upon any. government or people that gave it their sanction." 

We have also a statement of the true American position 
from President Roosevelt, who in his message to Congress in 
1902 said : — 

" No independent nation in America need have the slightest 
fear of aggression from the United States. It behooves each 
one to maintain order within its own borders and to discharge 
its just obligations to foreigners. When this is done, be they 
strong or weak, they have nothing to dread from outside inter- 
ference." 

Surely there is nothing in these words to indicate that a 
nation whose sovereignty we had expressly guaranteed was 
in a less favorable position than other American nations. 



These precedents show what we had considered our obliga- 
tions to Colombia under the treaty of 1 846, and how aggres- 
sion on a weak power was regarded by the Republican party 
at its birth and by its present official chief, while we may 
recall the peaceful declaration of Secretary Hay that our con- 
duct to other nations is regulated " by the Monroe Doctrine 
and the Golden Rule." 

Let us now compare these avowed, principles with the 
recent action of our government. Within the dominions of 
Colombia lies the half-finished Panama canal, begun under 
a concession from that government to a French company. 
This concession in terms provided that the company might 
transfer it to another company or individuals, but " not to any 
foreign nation or government." This was a reasonable con- 
dition, as no nation could afford to admit another nation into 
its territory as the owner of such a canal without a very dis- 
tinct understanding as to the respective rights of each. The 
French company became involved, and finally after much ne- 
gotiation the United States agreed to buy its rights for $40,- 
000,000, but in order to go on with the work it was necessary 
to reach some agreement with Colombia. 

Colombia was enjoying from the trans-isthmian railroad an 
income of about $600,000, which was an important part of 
her revenues. Her two cities of Panama and Colon owe 
their prosperity to the fact that they are the termini 'of steam- 
ship lines, where goods and passengers are embarked and dis- 
embarked for transit from ocean to ocean. When the canal 
is built, they become way-stations by which steamers will sail, 
taking from them perhaps some small supplies, but otherwise 
contributing little or no business to their citizens. Colombia, 
therefore, had a right to some compensation for the loss 
which she would probably sustain from the building of the 
canal, and it was vital to her that the relations between her 
government as sovereign over the territory, and the United 
States as the owner of the canal, should be defined clearly 
and satisfactorily. A great power is a dangerous subject of 
a weaker nation. 



The Hay-Herran treaty was an attempt to reach a satisfac- 
tory agreement on all these points, but it was rejected by the 
Colombian legislature, as our Senate rejected the Hay-Paunce- 
fote treaty and the many other treaties which are buried in 
that "graveyard of treaties." A conspicuous case was the 
rejection of the Johnson-Clarendon treaty for the settlement 
of the " Alabama " claims, which was given but a scant consid- 
eration because we could not present such large claims under 
it as we thought should be presented. 

The Colombian Senate acted strictly within its rights, and 
we have no more right to abuse the citizens of that Republic 
or their representatives because they did so, than England 
had to abuse us for endangering the peace between two 
great nations by rejecting the Johnson-Clarendon treaty, or 
than any man has to denounce another for refusing to sell 
his property at the price which the first wishes to pay for it. 
As a matter of fact, the provisions regulating the jurisdiction 
of Colombia over the canal were very unsatisfactory. It is 
from Harper s Weekly that I quote the following : — 

"The Hay-Herran treaty was unsatisfactory on these 
grounds : first, the lease was not perpetual, but renewable at 
long intervals ; secondly, the canal zone leased was too nar- 
row; thirdly, a conflict of jurisdiction within the canal zone 
seemed inevitable by reason of the complexity of the provi- 
sions of the convention." 

Is it necessary to assume that the Colombians were 
actuated only by base motives in refusing to admit their pow- 
erful and not too careful neighbor into their territory until 
this complexity was removed? When a supporter of the 
President's policy thus describes the rejected treaty, it is safe 
to infer that the Senate of Colombia could give good reasons 
for refusing to accept it! With any powerful nation we 
should have begun fresh negotiations; but Colombia was 
weak, and a different course suggested itself to our rulers. 

Let me state it in the words which President Roosevelt 
intended to use in his annual message to Congress : — 

" It seems evident that in a matter such as this we should 



IO 

finally decide which is the best route ; and, if the advantages 
of this route over any other possible route are sufficiently 
marked, we should then give notice that we can no longer 
submit to trifling or insincere dealing on the part of those 
whom the accident of position has placed in temporary control 
of the ground through which the route must pass : that, if 
they will come to agreement with us in straightforward 
fashion, we shall, in return, act not only with justice, but with 
generosity ; and that, if they fail to come to such agreement 
with us, we must forthwith take the matter into our own 
hands." 

Can any one point out the difference between this doctrine 
and that of the Ostend Manifesto ? There our right to seize 
Cuba, if Spain refused to sell it, was placed upon " the law 
of self-preservation." The President would have placed our 
right to take a canal zone on " sufficiently marked advan- 
tages " of the Panama route over other routes. Spain's prob- 
able refusal to sell Cuba was attributed to " stubborn pride 
and a false sense of honor." Colombia's rejection of our offer 
was to be treated as " trifling or insincere dealing." In both 
cases we were to take by force what the owner refused to sell 
at a price fixed by us, which in our own opinion was just and 
generous. 

While the administration was in this mood, occurred what 
Mr. Hay calls " the sudden and startling events which have 
so recently attracted the attention of this country and of the 
world." 

His account of these events may be quoted from his state- 
ment to the country made on November J. The people of 
Panama, he tells us, "went to work with that talent for 
prompt and secret organization to which there is no parallel 
among people of Northern blood. They prepared the ma- 
chinery of revolution in advance, and suddenly in a single day 
without the firing of a shot — with the exception of a few 
shells that were thrown into the city from a Colombian 
steamer in the harbor of Panama — ; they accomplished their 
independence. A government, consisting of the leading 



II 

citizens of the State, was at once organized and proclaimed to 
the world. A part of the Colombian forces joined the revo- 
lution : the rest returned to Colombia ; and, so far as we are 
able to judge, the new republic begins its career with no 
organized opposition throughout the entire extent of the 
Isthmus." 

There is no word in all this to indicate that this revolution 
was not as sudden and startling to him as to the country, or 
that the success of the revolution was in any way due to the 
United States. 

He proceeds : " The course of the President in this con- 
junction was marked out in advance by our principles and 
precedents. He gave orders that traffic from one side of the 
Isthmus to the other should be kept unimpeded by either 
party, and charged our officers in the Isthmus to use their ut- 
most influence " (and " influence " is a pleasant, peaceful 
word) "to prevent any attack by one of the contending fac- 
tions upon the other which would be calculated to cause a 
disturbance of traffic. When it was reported to him that 
a government capable of maintaining order had been estab- 
lished and was working without opposition, he did what was 
always done under such circumstances. He directed our 
representative at Panama, as soon as he was certain that a 
government capable of maintaining the public peace had been 
established by the consent of the people, that he was to enter 
into official relations with it. He also directed our minister 
at Bogota to inform the Colombian Government that we had 
entered into relations with the new provisional Government of 
Panama." 

We may note, in passing, that our representative was in- 
structed to enter into relations with the new government 
when he became satisfied of certain things ; but the adminis- 
tration did not wait for his report on this question, and imme- 
diately informed the government of Colombia that relations 
had actually been established with the new State. 

Now what were the facts ? 

The insurrection broke out late in the evening of November 3. 



12 



On June 9 Mr. Hay cabled our minister at Bogota : " If 
Colombia should now reject the treaty or unduly delay its 
ratification, the friendly understanding between the two coun- 
tries would be so seriously compromised that action might be 
taken by the Congress next winter which every friend of 
Colombia would regret." 

On October 24 the cruiser " Dixie " was ordered to put to 
sea at once with 400 marines in addition, to her regular crew, 
and it was reported that she was sent to Guantanamo, but in 
fact she went to Colon. 

On November 2 the Navy Department cabled to the com- 
mander of the " Nashville " at Colon : — 

" Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption 
threatened by armed force, occupy the line of railroad, pre- 
vent landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either 
government or insurgent, either at Colon, Porto Bello, or 
other points." 

The same orders were sent to the commanders of the 
"Boston" and "Dixie," while to Admiral Glass at Acapulco 
was sent the following : — 

" Proceed with all possible despatch to Panama. Telegraph 
in cipher your departure. Maintain free and uninterrupted 
transit. If interruption is threatened by armed force, occupy 
the line. Prevent landing of any armed force, either govern- 
ment or insurgent, with hostile intent, at any point within fifty 
miles of Panama. If doubtful as to the intent of any armed 
force, occupy Ancon Hill strongly with artillery. If the 
' Wyoming ' would delay ' Concord ' or ' Marblehead,' her dis- 
position must be left to your discretion. Government force 
reported approaching the isthmus in vessels. Prevent their 
landing, if in your judgment landing would precipitate a 
conflict." 

These orders were given to a force which had been gathered 
at and near the isthmus before any insurrection had occurred. 

On the next day, November 3, at 3.40 p.m., the Assistant 
Secretary of State, Mr. Loomis, sent to our consul at Panama 
this despatch : — 



13 • 

"Uprising on isthmus reported. Keep department 
promptly and fully informed." 

At 8.15 on the same day the consul replied: "No upris- 
ing yet. Reported will be to-night. Situation is critical." 

About an hour and a half later the revolution occurred, and 
the department was informed of the "sudden and startling 
event " for which the government had made such complete 
preparations in advance. 

On the night of November 2, 1903, Captain Hubbard of 
the " Nashville " reports that he allowed four or five hundred 
Colombian troops to land at Colon, not feeling justified in pre- 
venting them as the insurrection had not broken out, though 
he knew it was imminent, for he telegraphed on November 3 
to the Navy Department, " It is possible that movement may 
be made at Panama to-night to declare independence." At 
8.20 p.m. on the 3d the landing of these troops was reported 
to the State Department. At 8.45 p.m. the department replied, 
" The troops which landed from the ' Carthagena ' should not 
proceed to Panama." An hour later came the first news of 
the insurrection. 

The Colombian generals in command went to Panama on 
November 3, and were seized when the revolution began. 
" Except to a few people " nothing was known of this in 
Colon till the morning train arrived from Panama on the 4th ; 
but on the 3d Captain Hubbard went ashore, and learned 
what had happened and that the Colombian generals wanted 
their troops sent across to Panama. On the 3d Captain 
Hubbard refused to allow this, and early on the 4th he gave 
written notice that they could not leave. On the afternoon 
of the 4th he ordered a force from the Nashville ashore, and 
took possession of the railroad station, so that the Colombian 
troops could not move. The Colombian troops withdrew to a 
hill outside while their colonel sent a messenger to Panama, 
who was to return on the 5th. Hubbard occupied Colon on 
the 5 th, and the Colombian troops were confronted by our 
marines, and on the afternoon of the 5 th, reports Captain 
Hubbard, their colonel "was finally persuaded to embark 
. . . and return to ' Carthagena.' " 



• 14 

Now let us compare the language of Secretary Hay : 
" They prepared the machinery of revolution in advance. . . . 
They accomplished their independence. ... A part of the 
Colombian forces joined the revolution : the rest returned to 
Colombia. " 

The machinery of revolution was on board our gunboats. 
It was our forces that accomplished the independence of 
Panama. We cannot doubt for a moment that Dr. Manuel 
Amador spoke the truth when he said in the Independent last 
week, — 

" Of course we expected that the United States would not 
let the Colombian troops attack us." 

Who gave him the right to expect this ? 

What is the government now called "the new republic"? 
A self -constituted junta of three men. Who is their repre- 
sentative in Washington ? A French engineer connected 
with the French Canal Company, appointed by the three. 
They have no courts, no constitution, no frame of govern- 
ment, no legislature, no evidence of popular assent. 

" So far as we are able to judge, the new republic," says 
Secretary Hay, " begins its career with no organized opposi- 
tion throughout the entire extent of the isthmus." 

Why ? Because the United States withstood the forces of 
the government, forbade them to fire, and forced them to 
leave the isthmus. The organized opposition of the Colom- 
bian government was paralyzed by our superior force. It 
takes a few days to organize a new opposition. The insur- 
rection began on the night of the 3d. Secretary Hay's state- 
ment was issued on the 7th. 

That opposition exists, and the reason why it is not or- 
ganized may be gathered from the news brought by passengers 
on the "Alliance" from Colon and telegraphed from New 
York on December 1. 

" It was denied that the prisons were filled with political 
prisoners, but about 1 30 persons in all, it was said, were de- 
ported for showing discontent." 

A government of three men have already banished one 



i5 

hundred and thirty for showing discontent, and this arbitrary 
junta is called a republic. Surely, these men do not feel very 
secure of their fellow-citizens, or they could afford to neglect 
a few malcontents. With the forces of the United States 
behind the junta, their fellow-citizens cannot resist them if 
they would. 

On the 5 th the United States received from Panama a 
formal announcement, signed by the three persons calling 
themselves a junta, that the Republic of Panama was es- 
tablished. 

On the 6th the new government of Panama is recognized. 
Thus reads the despatch of that date to our minister at 
Bogota : — 

"The people of Panama, having by an apparently unani- 
mous movement dissolved their political connection with the 
Republic of Colombia and resumed their independence, and 
having adopted a government of their own, republican in 
form." 

Since when was a self -elected junta of three, supported by 
foreign bayonets against their lawful rulers, not elected by the 
people, and with absolute power unfettered by constitutional 
restraint, a government "republican in form"? What did 
our government know as to the sentiments of the people of 
Panama in less than two days after this junta had seized the 
power ? 

On the 17th of November the conmissioners from the 
junta sent to negotiate a new treaty reached this country. 
The treaty was ready for them when they reached Wash- 
ington ; and it was negotiated, signed, and sealed between 
lunch and dinner. Its first article is as follows : — 

" The United States guarantees and agrees to maintain the 
independence of the Republic of Panama." 

Its second article cedes to the United States a strip of land 
across the isthmus. 

The treaty is sent to the junta for ratification. The ten 
million dollars which Colombia rejected is now to be paid to 
Panama, and on December 2d the junta ratines the treaty. 



i6 

All this has been done against the protest of Colombia, 
prevented by the forces of the United States from quelling 
the revolt at once, and now notified that the United States 
will resist any attempt by it to assert that sovereignty which 
the United States by -solemn treaty agreed " practically and 
efficaciously " to maintain. 

These facts are undisputed. They appear by official docu- 
ments. It is not necessary to point ou^ that the revolution 
was hatched in New York. It is not necessary to inquire 
whether the revolutionists consulted Mr. Hay in September, 
informed him that the outbreak was " scheduled to take place 
on September 23," and were advised to postpone it, as is 
stated in the New York papers. We know that the plan was 
known to our authorities in advance, that they prepared to 
aid the revolutionists by force, that they did so, and that to 
their interposition the success of the revolution is due. 

It is clear that our action is in distinct violation of our 
solemn treaty. Its language is plain, and the obvious inter- 
pretation of that language is sustained by our action under 
previous administrations. 

It is clear that, if there had been no treaty, our action 
would have been in flagrant violation of international law. 
Our mere recognition of the new government as and when it 
was made was unjustified. 

To quote three authorities ; John Quincy Adams in dealing 
with the question of recognizing the South American Re- 
publics said to President Monroe : " There is a stage in such 
contests when recognition of independence may be granted 
without departure from the obligations of neutrality. It is 
the stage when independence is established as a matter of fact 
so as to leave the chances of the opposite party to recover 
their dominion utterly desperate." 

Charles Sumner, in an elaborate speech on the action of 
England in recognizing the Southern Confederacy as a bel- 
ligerent, after a careful review of the precedents, said : — 

" The conclusion, then, is clear. To justify recognition, it 
must appear beyond doubt that de facto the contest is finished, 



17 

and that de facto the new government is established secure 
within fixed limits. These are conditions precedent, not to be 
avoided without open offence to a friendly power, and open 
violation of that International Law which is the guardian of 
the world's peace." 

" Armed recognition is simply recognition by coercion. It 
is a belligerent act, constituting war, and can be vindicated 
only as war. . . . But an attempt under guise of recognition to 
coerce the dismemberment or partition of a country is in its 
nature offensive beyond ordinary war." 

In his message of April n, 1898, Mr. McKinley, seeking 
to justify his refusal to recognize the independence of Cuba, 
said : — 

" They are evidences that the United States, in addition to 
the test imposed by public law as the condition of the recog- 
nition of independence by a neutral state (to wit, that the 
revolted state shall ' constitute in fact a body politic, having 
a government in substance as well as in name, possessed*©! - the 
elements of stability,' and forming de facto, 'if left to itself, a 
state among the nations reasonably capable of discharging the 
duties of a state '), has imposed for its own governance in deal- 
ing with cases like these the further condition that recogni- 
tion of independent statehood is not due to a revolted 

DEPENDENCY UNTIL THE DANGER OF ITS BEING SUBJUGATED 
BY THE PARENT STATE HAS ENTIRELY PASSED AWAY." 

It is impossible to say that on November 6 the govern- 
ment of Panama was such a government as Mr. McKinley de- 
scribed, or that the danger of its being subjugated by Colombia 
had passed away, when Colombia had hardly learned that an 
insurrection had occurred. 

Remember our denunciation of England's action during the 
Civil War. Remember our repeated refusals to recognize 
Cuba, our long delay in recognizing the South American re- 
publics, our action toward the Transvaal Republic and the 
Orange Free State, our denial that the Philippine Republic 
existed, though it had legislature, courts, schools, and the de- 
voted support of a whole people, and then tell me where are 



the precedents which justify the administration's course. It 
is a gross violation of international law. It is the doctrine of 
the Ostend Manifesto adopted and put in force by the gov- 
ernment of the United States. It is war. 

International law has no meaning, if it does not bind the 
strong nation in its dealings with the weak, — if it is obeyed 
only when it is dangerous to disobey it. That great system of 
jurisprudence built up by the labors of enlightened statesmen 
and jurists during centuries rests upon principles of eternal 
justice ; and, if its rules can be set aside from motives of in- 
terest or ambition whenever a great people or its rulers for 
the moment desire, there is no international law save " the 
highwayman's plea that ' might makes right.' " It should be 
the highest ambition of our great republic to be a leader 
among the peoples in 'scrupulous regard for the rights of the 
weak rather than in the reckless exercise of overwhelming 
power at their expense. 

But we want the canal. That is true, but not at any cost. 
We want many good things in this world. We should like to 
see property more equally divided. We should like to see land 
held by men who would use it 'best for the interests of all 
rather than by the shiftless and inefficient. We should like 
to see criminals promptly punished. We should like to see 
men who have plundered their neighbors compelled to disgorge 
their ill-gotten gains. We should like to see corrupt politicians 
driven from public life. But we do not believe in - securing 
these good things by lawless violence. We wish ours to be 
"a government of laws, and not of men." We believe in 
courts, not in irresponsible despotism ; and we refuse to let the 
most honest reformer redistribute our property or punish our 
criminals as he thinks best. The crying evil of the time is 
the tendency of men to make their desires the standard for 
other men's duties, and to consider their wills backed by their 
hands a substitute for law. It is not safe to let a strong 
man decide what is just to the weak. Such a doctrine means 
anarchy. Justice is the same for individuals and nations, and 
a great power has no more right to rob a weak one than the 
prize-fighter has to plunder the minister. 



19 

The course of the administration is wrong- legally and 
morally. 

It violates at once the solemn obligations of a treaty and 
the well-settled rules of international law. It teaches the 
weaker republics of this hemisphere to distrust and fear us, 
and to adopt perhaps the Mexican proverb, " There is no such 
wolf as the shameless Yankee." It tarnishes the fair name 
of this country among the nations of the world. It estab- 
lishes a precedent which is sure in the future to embarrass 
us. It sets an unhappy example of lawlessness to our citi- 
zens, already too prone to disregard the law at the dictates of 
passion or interest. Far worse than all these it lowers the 
moral standard of our whole people, since many just and 
honest men struggle to apologize for action which their con- 
sciences disapprove and which, if taken by Germany or Eng- 
land, they would indignantly condemn, either because they 
confound their country with the politicians who represent 
it and believe that patriotism compels them to defend what- 
ever these politicians do, or because they feel bound to stand 
by their party, right or wrong, and to put their party above 
their country. 

Hear the voice of a friendly English journal : — 

"We regret exceedingly that President Roosevelt has 
allowed the fair name of his Administration to be smirched by 
a transaction so utterly at variance with the most elementary 
principles of public law and international morality. We can- 
not conceive a more lamentable outrage on the public con- 
science of the civilized world." {London Graphic?) 

If you prefer American testimony, you may find it in the 
history of Mr. Rhodes, where, speaking of the Ostend Mani- 
festo, he said its' sentiments were "abhorrent to justice and at 
war with the opinion of the civilized world." 

Emerson has well stated the universal law : — 

. " The end for which man was made was not crime in any 

form ; and a man cannot steal without incurring the penalties 

of the thief, though all the legislatures vote that it is virtuous, 

and though there be a general conspiracy among scholars and 



official persons to hold him up, and to say, ' Nothing is good 
but stealing.' " 

It would be better for this country, for its teachers and its 
young scholars, if we had taken the isthmus by open force than 
it is to take it as it has been taken, while pretending that our 
course is justified by international law and public morals. 
Robbery is wrong, but it lacks the element of mean hypocrisy 
which attends obtaining goods by false pretences. Open 
robbery also is recognized as wrong, and is condemned ; but, if 
crime is concealed by specious phrases, it goes undetected. 
" The world is still deceived by ornament." 

It is not patriotic to defend such action. The true 
patriot must desire for his country that " righteousness " 
which " exalteth a nation." May he not jealously guard her 
honor, and treat as a public enemy him who would tarnish it ? 
It is by such acts as this that a nation loses its greatest 
strength, the strength which our country once enjoyed, and 
which comes from the respect and confidence of our fellow- 
men. We have the same right and the same duty that the 
first Republican National Convention exercised and discharged 
when it declared that the Ostend Manifesto " was in every 
respect unworthy of American diplomacy, and would bring 
shame and dishonor upon any government or people that gave 
it their sanction." 

Let us strive to save our country from such shame and dis- 
honor now by vigorously protesting against the spoliation of 
Colombia, and let us urge our countrymen to believe that a 
deserved reputation for scrupulously regarding the rights of 
others — a sincere belief in justice — is worth more than all 
the dollars which can be piled upon our broad territory. 



